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Mayers [1], Lo and Chau[2, 3] argued that all quantum bit commitment protocols are insecure,
because there is no way to prevent an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) cheating attack. However,
Yuen [4, 5, 6] presented some protocols which challenged the previous impossibility argument. Up to
now, it is still debated whether there exist or not unconditionally secure protocols[7]. In this paper
the above controversy is addressed. For such purpose, a complete classification of all possible bit
commitment protocols is given, including all possible cheating attacks. Focusing on the simplest class
of protocols (non-aborting and with complete and perfect verification), it is shown how naturally
a game-theoretical situation arises. For these protocols, bounds for the cheating probabilities are
derived, involving the two quantum operations encoding the bit values and their respective alternate
Kraus decompositions. Such bounds are different from those given in the impossibility proof[1, 2, 3].
The whole classification and analysis has been carried out using a finite open system approach.
The discrepancy with the impossibility proof is explained on the basis of the implicit adoption
of a closed system approach—equivalent to modeling the commitment as performed by two fixed
machines interacting unitarily in a overall closed system—according to which it is possible to assume
as openly known both the initial state and the probability distributions for all secret parameters,
which can be then purified. This approach is also motivated by existence of unitary extensions
for any open system. However, it is shown that the closed system approach for the classification of
commitment protocols unavoidably leads to infinite dimensions, which then invalidate the continuity
argument at the basis of the impossibility proof.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ta
I. INTRODUCTION
Among all kinds of quantum cryptography protocols,
the quantum bit commitment is a crucial element to build
up more sophisticated protocols, such as remote quantum
gambling [8], coin tossing [9], and unconditionally secure
two-party quantum computation [10]. Therefore, it is
of practical relevance to establish if there exist secure
quantum bit commitment protocols.
In the bit commitment Alice provides Bob with a piece
of evidence that she has chosen a bit b = 0, 1 which she
commits to him. Later, Alice will open the commitment,
revealing the bit b to Bob, and proving that it is indeed
the committed bit with the evidence in Bob’s posses-
sion. Therefore, Alice and Bob should agree on a proto-
col which satisfies simultaneously the three requirements:
(1) it must be concealing, namely Bob should not be able
to retrieve b before the opening; (2) it must be binding,
namely Alice should not be able to change b after the
commitment; (3) it must be verifiable, namely Bob must
be able to check b against the evidence in his possession,
according to the rules of the protocol. In a in-principle
proof of security of the commitment it is supposed that
both parties possess unlimited technology, e. g. compu-
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tational power, space, time, etc., and the protocol is said
unconditionally secure if neither Alice nor Bob can cheat
with significant probability of success as a consequence
of physical laws.
In 1993, a quantum mechanical protocol was
proposed[9], and the unconditional security of this pro-
tocol has been generally accepted for long time. The
insecurity of this protocol was shown by Mayers, Lo and
Chau[1, 2, 3] in 1997, where it was recognized the pos-
sibility for Alice to cheat by entangling the committed
evidence with a quantum system in her possession, and
it was argued that no unconditionally secure protocol
is possible. Finally after 2000 Yuen[4, 5, 6] presented
some protocols which challenged the previous impossi-
bility proof, mostly on the basis of the possibility of en-
coding the bit on an anonymous state given to Alice by
Bob and known only to him, and suggesting the use of
decoy systems that make the protocol concealing in the
limit of infinitely many systems, with the possibility for
Bob of performing his quantum measurement before Al-
ice opening, whence disputing the general availability of
EPR cheating for Alice. Besides the above schemes, pro-
tocols have also been suggested based on the theory of
special relativity [11] (for historical reviews on the quan-
tum bit commitment see Refs. [3, 6]). Here, however, we
will consider only non relativistic protocols.
In this paper, in order to provide clarifications on the
issue of existence of unconditionally secure protocols, we
will give a complete classification of all possible bit com-
2mitment protocols based on a single commitment step,
and show how a multi-step commitment can be reduced
to a single one. We will analyze all possibilities of cheat-
ing for both parties. Then, we will focus on the sim-
plest class of protocols, namely the non-aborting pro-
tocols with complete and perfect verification, showing
that naturally a game-theoretical situation arises. As we
will see, even though perfectly concealing protocols are
certainly not binding (i. e. Alice has a unit cheating
probability), the protocol could still be binding if it is
ε-concealing. Bounds for the cheating probabilities of
these protocols are derived, involving the two quantum
operations encoding the bit values and their respective
alternate Kraus decompositions. Such bounds turn out
to be different from those given in the impossibility proof
[1, 2, 3]. In the final discussion we will see how the dis-
crepancy between the two opposite analysis arises, as a
result of the restrictive assumption—which lies beneath
the impossibility proof—of openly known, whence pu-
rifiable, probability distributions for all secret parame-
ters. Such an assumption is equivalent to modeling the
commitment as a closed system made of two fixed ma-
chines interacting unitarily. It is shown that such model-
ing, along with the requirement of unlimited technology,
necessarily lead to infinite dimensions, which invalidate
the continuity argument at the basis of the impossibility
proof. Instead, one either needs to prove the continuity
argument for infinite dimensions, or else must adopt a
finite open system approach.
II. THE CLASSIFICATION OF PROTOCOLS
The most general bit commitment scheme with a single
step is of the form: (1) Bob prepares the Hilbert space
H with the anonymous state |ϕ〉 ∈ H, and sends H to
Alice; (2) Alice modulates the value b of the committed
bit on the anonymous state |ϕ〉 and sends the output
back to Bob. The bit modulation is a quantum oper-
ation (QO) parametrized by b = 0, 1. It is clear that
this general scheme contains all possibilities, including
the anonymous-state based protocols of Yuen [4, 5, 6, 7],
and, as a special case, the original protocols by Mayers
[1], and Lo and Chau[2, 3], which correspond to openly
known state |ϕ〉.
A. Bit modulation
To make the protocol concealing and at the same time
verifiable, the modulation must be a choice between two
ensembles of QO’s {M(b)j } for b = 0, 1, from T(H) to
T(K), where T(H) denotes the set of traceclass opera-
tors on H, and generally the two Hilbert spaces K and H
are not isomorphic. We will name the cases K ⊇ H and
K ⊆ H extending modulation and restricting modulation,
respectively, the extending case including the possibility
of using decoy systems. The variable j is a secret pa-
rameter known only to Alice, parametrizing the choice
of different forms for the modulation, and which will be
declared to Bob at the opening.
B. The secret-parameter space
Alice has always the option of choosing j by prepar-
ing a secret-parameter space P in a state chosen from an
orthonormal set {|j〉}, and performing the QO on H⊗P
M
(b) .=
∑
j
M
(b)
j ⊗ Pj , (1)
with Pj representing the orthonormal projection map
Pj(ρ) = |j〉〈j|ρ|j〉〈j|. The actually performed map de-
pends on the state preparation ρP that Alice choses for
P, and any (pure or mixed) state will be equivalent to a
set of probabilities p
(b)
j = 〈j|ρ(b)P |j〉 for the secret param-
eter j as follows
TrP[M
(b)( |ϕ〉〈ϕ| ⊗ ρ(b)
P
)] =
∑
j
M
(b)
j (|ϕ〉〈ϕ|)〈j|ρ(b)P |j〉.
(2)
C. Reduction to trace-preserving maps
The maps M
(b)
j are generally trace-decreasing, i. e.
they may be achieved with nonunit probability. In terms
of the Kraus decomposition for any input state ρ
M
(b)
j (ρ) =
∑
i
E
(b)
ji ρE
(b)
ji
†, (3)
this means that generally
∑
i
E
(b)
ji
†E
(b)
ji ≤ I. (4)
Strictly trace-decreasing maps correspond to aborting
protocols, namely when Alice doesn’t succeed in achiev-
ing the map the protocol is aborted. By completing the
sum in Eq. (4) with additional terms in order to get the
identity, we see that a trace decreasing map is equiva-
lent to a trace preserving one, with additional outcomes
i corresponding to the protocol aborted.
D. Reduction to unitary
Alice has unlimited technology, whence she can always
achieve E
(b)
ji knowingly, i. e. she has the option of achiev-
ing each trace-preserving map M
(b)
j as a perfect pure mea-
surement. This can be done as follows (in the following
3we will temporarily drop the indices b and j). The trace-
preserving QO can be written in the form
M(ρ) = TrF[EρE
†],
E =
∑
i
Ei ⊗ |i〉F ∈ B(H,K ⊗ F) isometry, (5)
for a suitable ancillary space F (notice the tensor nota-
tion E ⊗ |ψ〉
F
that for E operator in B(H,K) represents
an “extension” operator from H to K ⊗ F. By unitary
embedding H into K ⊗ F ≃ H ⊗ A for another suitable
ancillary space A as E = U(IH ⊗ |ω〉A), with U unitary
on H⊗ A ≃ K⊗ F, we have
M(ρ) = TrF[U(ρ⊗ |ω〉〈ω|A)U †], (6)
namely Alice prepares the ancilla (and decoy systems) in
the state |ω〉, and then performs a complete von Neu-
mann measurement on F, with outcome i, which she
keeps secret [the possibility of using a more general type
of measurement is already considered in an extended
space F]. The strictly trace-decreasing case would cor-
respond to write
M(ρ) = TrF[(IK ⊗ ΣF)U(ρ⊗ |ω〉〈ω|A)U †], (7)
with ΣF orthogonal projector on a subspace of F. In
conclusion, Alice can achieve the QO M(ρ) =
∑
i EiρE
†
i
knowingly by: (1) preparing an ancilla/decoy state |ω〉
A
∈
A; (2) performing a unitary transformation U on H⊗ A;
(3) performing a complete von Neumann measurement
on F, with K ⊗ F ≃ H ⊗ A and outcome i; (4) sending
K to Bob. Notice that we can have both extending and
restricting protocols, depending on the choice of A and
F. At this point, the encoding maps are given by
M(b)(|ϕ〉〈ϕ|) =∑
j
p
(b)
j TrF[(IK ⊗ Σ(b)jF )U (b)j (|ϕ〉〈ϕ| ⊗ |ω〉〈ω|A)U (b)j †], (8)
with |ω〉 independent on j and b, since any dependence
can be included in U
(b)
j . Notice that if all orthogonal
projectors Σ
(b)
j on subspaces of F have the same rank,
their dependence on j and b can also be included in U
(b)
j ,
but generally rank(Σ
(b)
j ) depends on both j and b. For
the moment, we will focus attention on the case in which
rank(Σ
(b)
j ) is independent on j. Now, by considering the
unitary operator U (b) =
∑
j U
(b)
j ⊗|j〉〈j| over H⊗A⊗P ≃
K ⊗ F ⊗ P, we see that Alice can achieve any possible
commitment step as follows
M(b)(|ϕ〉〈ϕ|) =
TrF⊗P[(IK ⊗ Σ(b)F )U (b)(|ϕ〉〈ϕ| ⊗ |ω〉〈ω|A ⊗ ρP)U (b)†],
(9)
where also ρP is independent on b, whence, since also the
probabilities p
(b)
j will be independent on b, we will denote
them simply as pj .
E. Opening step
In a protocol which is completely and perfectly ver-
ifiable Alice tells b along with the secret parameter j
and the secret outcome i to Bob, who verifies the state
E
(b)
ji |ϕ〉. (In a protocol that is not perfectly verifiable, the
disclosed state is generally mixed, e. g. Alice keeps the
outcome i secret, or join outcomes in composite events as
in a degenerate Luders measurement). However, we em-
phasize that, whatever is the rule for the opening, Alice
has always the option of achieving the encoding QO by
performing a complete von Neuman measurement. Since
the local QO’s on K and F ⊗ P commute, Alice has the
possibility of: (1) first sending K to Bob; (2) then per-
forming the measurement on F ⊗ P at the very last mo-
ment of the opening. As we will see, this is the basis for
Alice EPR cheating attacks. Notice that strictly trace-
decreasing QO’s—i. e. aborting protocols—pose limita-
tions to Alice’s EPR cheating. In fact, Alice cannot de-
lay the abortion of the protocol at the opening, and must
declare it at the commitment. Since both secret parame-
ters j and i can be conveniently measured by Alice, they
can be treated on equal footings as a single parameter
J ≡ (j, i). The two maps are then
M(b)(|ϕ〉〈ϕ|) =
∑
j
pjM
(b)
j (|ϕ〉〈ϕ|)
=
∑
J
E
(b)
J |ϕ〉〈ϕ|E(b)J †,
(10)
with E
(b)
J
.
=
√
pjE
(b)
ji ∈ B(H,K).
F. Reduction to a single commitment step
A protocol with more than a commitment step gener-
ally consists of a sequence of conditioned QO’s, namely
in which one party is requested to make a different QO,
say {N(x)}, depending on the outcome x of a previous
QO from the other party. However, the same result is
achieved by automatizing the conditioned QO, and using
instead the unconditioned one N =
∑
xN
(x) ⊗ Px on an
extended Hilbert space H ⊗ N, without even knowing x.
If the knowledge of x is requested only at the opening–
as for nonaborting protocols—then the orthogonal mea-
surement Px can be delayed up to the opening moment,
since the notepad space N is kept by the party. Then,
analogously as for a single commitment step, each QO
can be achieved knowingly, by means of a pure measure-
ment, with a suitable unitary embedding. Again, since
the measurement-ancillary space (F in the above ana-
lyzed single commitment step) is kept by the considered
party, its measurement can be delayed up to the opening
moment (for strictly trace decreasing maps the two par-
ties can agree to declare the abortion at the end of the
whole commitment). At this point, we have a sequence of
interlaced unitary operators, one from each party alter-
natively, e. g. for three steps U ′
(b)
A UBU
(b)
A , where clearly
4the unitary transformation by Bob UB cannot depend
on b. Now, for a numerable set of possible unitary trans-
formations UB ∈ {Ul}, Bob can use instead the unitary
UB =
∑
l Ul ⊗ |l〉〈l| by preparing a state from an or-
thogonal set {|l〉} on an additional Hilbert space. There-
fore, the choice of the unitary is equivalent to the state
preparation of another anonymous-state Hilbert space.
In conclusion, from the arguments above we see that the
whole multi-step (non aborting) protocol is equivalent to
a single-step one, with larger spaces H, K, A, F, and P.
We don’t know what is the minimal Hilbert space for
anonymous-state preparation of a generally continuous
set of unitary operators, for which one may need a non
separable space. Notice that with a teleportation proto-
col it is possible to achieve any contraction on a space
H by performing a state preparation on the space H⊗ H
of the entangled resource, however, only with probability
equal to dim(H)−2.
G. Classical protocols
It is obvious that a classification of quantum proto-
cols must include also the classical ones as a particular
case. In fact, the classical protocols correspond to con-
sider just orthogonal states, and QO’s on abelian opera-
tor algebras. Consider, for example, a one-way trapdoor
function fA(j), where the integer j plays the role of the
secret parameter. Let the value b if the committed bit be
the parity of j. Then, Alice sends the state |n〉 ⊗ |fA〉 to
Bob, with n = fA(j). Bob can verify that fA is indeed
one-way. However, since he cannot compute j from the
knowledge of n, he can just guess whether j is even or
odd. At the opening Alice tells j to Bob, and Bob verifies
that indeed n = fA(j) and evaluates the parity of j.
III. CHEATING
For the moment we will focus attention on non-
aborting protocols, postponing the discussion of the
aborting (strictly decreasing) case. Alice can cheat at two
different moments: before and after the commitment. We
will name the two cases: pre-cheating and post-cheating,
respectively. Bob, as we will see, can perform a combined
attack before and after the commitment. The possibility
also for Alice of performing a combined attack will be
also discussed.
A. Alice pre-cheating attacks
These correspond to prepare the ancillary spaces A⊗P
in a state not of the prescribed form |ω〉〈ω|A ⊗ ρP. This
will generally lead to QO’s different from the ones pre-
scribed from the protocol. In the following, we will not
further analyze pre-cheating, for the two following rea-
sons: (1) it seems that there is no practical use for Alice
to cheat before knowing if the committed bit needed to be
changed; (2) either there is a chance that the pre-cheating
will be detected at the opening, or it would lead to QO’s
indistinguishable from the prescribed ones, in which case
it will give the same result of a post-cheating attack con-
sidered in the following. Finally, notice that a cheating
attack based on changing the prescribed unitaries U (b)
belongs to the same class of pre-cheating attacks, and
the same considerations hold.
B. Alice post-cheating attacks
After the commitment and before the opening Alice
can try to cheat by performing a unitary transforma-
tion V on F ⊗ P: this is the so-called EPR attack. The
maneuver will not change the QO’s M(b), however, it
will change the Kraus decompositions—which are rele-
vant at the opening—giving a new set of contractions
{E(b)J } → {E(b)J (V )} with the same cardinality, in the
following way
E
(b)
J (V ) =
∑
L
E
(b)
L VJL, VJL = 〈J |V |L〉. (11)
Another attack available to Alice is also that of declaring
a J different from the actual outcome: however, since
Alice doesn’t know the anonymous state |ϕ〉, she must
adopt a fixed rule to scramble the J ’s, and being just a
permutation, this cheating is again equivalent to a uni-
tary cheating transformation V .
The probability that Alice can cheat successfully in
pretending having committed, say, b = 1, whereas she
committed b = 0 instead, is given by
PAc (V, ϕ) =
∑
J
|〈ϕ|E(0)J †(V )E(1)J |ϕ〉|2
||E(1)J ϕ||2
, (12)
and it clearly depends on the anonymous state |ϕ〉 and on
the cheating transformation V . However, Alice doesn’t
know |ϕ〉, and the optimal choice of V obviously depends
on |ϕ〉. So, which is the transformation V to be used?
Without any knowledge of |ϕ〉, the best Alice can do
is to adopt a conservative strategy, by choosing the V
such that the minimum P (V, ϕ) for |ϕ〉 chosen by Bob
is maximum, namely she maximizes her probability of
cheating in the worst case, corresponding to the minimax
choice of V
(PAc )µ
.
= max
V
min
ϕ
PAc (V, ϕ). (13)
It is evident that in this way a game theoretical situa-
tion arises, in which Bob choses |ϕ〉 and Alice choses V ,
with the probability P (V, ϕ) playing the role of a payoff
matrix. Obviously Alice and Bob can generally adopt
randomized strategies, which can then be purified via
entanglement with an ancillary system. However, in the
general situation the game is further complicated by the
5fact that Bob’s choice for |ϕ〉 is also dictated by max-
imization of his own probability of cheating (see later),
and all other parameters—such as Alice secret parameter
j—must enter the game. Since we are only interested to
set the debate on the impossibility proof[1, 2, 3] via a
complete classification of all protocols and cheating at-
tacks, this game situation, which arises as a consequence
of using anonymous states, will be analyzed elsewhere.
Another possibility for Alice’s choice of V would be
that of maximizing the probability P (V, ϕ) averaged over
all anonymous states, with the unitarily invariant proba-
bility measure dµ(ϕ) on the (compact) manifold of pure
states, namely
(PAc )av = max
V
∫
dµ(ϕ)PAc (V, ϕ). (14)
However, such a (pure) strategy will not be optimal if
Bob chooses a non uniform probability distribution, e. g.
a delta-function, and the actual probability of cheating
could be much lower than the one in Eq. (14). It is
obvious that for compact manifold of states—i. e. for
finite dimensions—then the two probabilities in Eqs. (13)
and (14) will be related by a constant depending on the
dimension of H.
The evaluation of the average in Eq. (14) is made
difficult by the presence of the norm in the denominator.
When the encoding for b = 1 is random unitary, i. e.
E
(1)
J =
√
pJU
(1)
J with unitary U
(1)
J , the evaluation of the
average in Eq. (14) is simplified by the following identity
which holds for any couple of operators A,B ∈ B(H) for
d
.
= dim(H) <∞∫
dµ(ϕ)〈ϕ|A|ϕ〉〈ϕ|B|ϕ〉
=
1
d(d+ 1)
[Tr(A)Tr(B) + Tr(AB)].
(15)
Using Eq. (15) the averaged probability in Eq. (14)
rewrites
(PAc )av =
1
d+ 1
+
1
d(d+ 1)
max
V
∑
J
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
L
Tr
(
U
(1)
J
†E
(0)
L
)
VLJ
∣∣∣∣∣
2
,
(16)
which can be bounded as follows
1
d+ 1
≤ (PAc )av ≤
1
d+ 1
+
1
d(d + 1)
||Z||1 ,
Z(JL)K = Tr[U
(1)
K
†E
(0)
J ] Tr[U
(1)
K E
(0)
L
†],
(17)
where ||·||1 denotes the trace-norm, and the matrix
Z(JL)K has to be considered as rectangular, with (JL)
as a single index. From Eq. (17) we see that in order to
reduce Alice’s cheating probability we better increase the
dimension of the anonymous-state Hilbert space. The up-
per bound in Eq. (17) could be useful for proving uncon-
ditional security of the protocol: however, we don’t know
if the trace norm in Eq. (17) is bounded as ||Z||1 ≤ d2,
otherwise the bound (17) would be useless (one can check
that ||Z||1 = d2 in the perfectly concealing case).
C. Bob cheating
Bob can try to cheat by making the best discrimina-
tion between the two maps M(b) =
∑
j pjM
(b)
j . However,
since he doesn’t know the probabilities pj actually used
by Alice, his strategy will be suboptimal, and his actual
cheating probability PBc will be lower than the probabil-
ity (PBc )opt corresponding to the optimal strategy with
the right probabilities pj . Since map-discrimination is
generally more reliable with the map acting locally on
an entangled state[12], instead of preparing |ϕ〉 ∈ H Bob
prepares an entangled state on H ⊗ R and sends only
H to Alice. (Here, we can see clearly that the use of
anonymous states in the protocol, while limiting Alice
EPR cheating attacks, at the same time allows Bob to
perform EPR attacks himself). Therefore, Bob’s optimal
probability of cheating is bounded as follows (for equally
probable bit values b = 0, 1)
PBc ≤ (PBc )opt =
1
2
+
max
|ϕ〉∈H⊗R
1
4
∣∣∣∣∣∣M(1) ⊗ IR(|ϕ〉〈ϕ|)−M(0) ⊗ IR(|ϕ〉〈ϕ|)∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
=
1
2
+
1
4
∣∣∣∣∣∣M(1) −M(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣
cb
,
(18)
where ||·||cb denotes the completely bounded (CB)
norm[13], and we used the fact that the difference of two
CP maps is Hermitian-preserving, whence its CB-norm is
achieved on a normalized vector in H⊗R. Notice that for
trace-preserving QO’s the difference M(1)−M(0) is never
completely positive, and generally an entangled anony-
mous state improves the discrimination, whereas for
aborting protocols the QO’s are strictly trace-decreasing,
and the difference map can be completely positive itself,
in which case the EPR attack is of no use (for such anal-
ysis on discriminations between QO’s, see Ref. [12]).
Symbol Hilbert space
H Anonymous state
K Output
A Preparation ancilla/decoy
P Secret parameter
F Measurement ancilla
R Bob cheating space
Rng(Σ) Range of Σ (abortion)
TABLE I: List of Hilbert spaces needed for protocol and
cheating attacks classification.
6start commitment after commitment
Alice A,P H,A,P F,P
Bob H,R R K,R
TABLE II: Who owns which space and when.
D. Discussion on the aborting (strictly
trace-decreasing) protocols
In the simplest case in which the projector Σ is inde-
pendent on both b and j, Alice can launch an EPR attack
easily, performing it on the range space of Σ. However,
when the rank of Σ depends on b, an EPR attack has
a probability of being detected by Bob at the opening
when the attack leads to a larger Kraus cardinality than
the prescribed one. Notice also that, in general, a de-
pendence of rank(Σ) on b and/or j will enhance Bob’s
probability of cheating.
Up to now we have seen that in order to classify all
possible protocols and cheating attacks we need to con-
sider seven Hilbert spaces with different physical mean-
ings: these are summarized in Tables I and II.
E. Perfectly concealing protocols
A perfectly concealing protocol means that the CB-
norm in Eq. (18) is zero, namely the two maps are the
same. Therefore, the two Kraus are connected via a uni-
tary transformation V on F⊗P, and Alice can cheat with
probability one, namely the protocol is not binding.
F. Approximate concealing protocols
We consider now the case in which Bob’s probability of
cheating for the optimal strategy is infinitesimally close
to the pure guessing probability 12 , which means that also
the CB-norm distance between the maps is infinitesimal,
i. e. ||M(1)−M(0)||cb = ε. We emphasize that generally ε
is vanishing for increasing dimension of K (see, for exam-
ple, some protocols given by Yuen[6], where the approx-
imately concealing condition is achieved for increasingly
large number of decoy systems), and no obvious continu-
ity argument can be invoked to assert that Alice cheating
probability will approach unit for vanishing ε. More pre-
cisely, in the present context based on anonymous states,
such an argument (which is at the basis of the impossi-
bility proof of Refs.[1, 2, 3]) would imply that for both
the minimax and the averaged strategies in Eqs. (13)
and (14) Alice probability of cheating would be infinites-
imally close to unit for ε→ 0, namely
1− (PAc )µ,av = ω
(∣∣∣∣∣∣M(1) −M(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣
cb
)
, (19)
for some function ω(ε) independent on the dimension of K
and vanishing with ε. However, using anonymous states
such assertion may turn out to be false. In fact, it is ob-
vious that if there is an alternate Kraus decomposition
{E(0)J (V )} for the map M(0) such that the two Kraus
{E(0)J (V )} and {E(1)J } are close, then the protocol is ap-
proximately concealing and not binding, since (see Ap-
pendix)
(PBc )opt −
1
2
=
1
4
∣∣∣∣∣∣M(1) −M(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣
cb
≤ 1
2
√√√√∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
J
∣∣∣E(0)J (V )− E(1)J ∣∣∣2
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣, (20)
PAc (V, ϕ) ≥
[
1− 1
2
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
J
∣∣∣E(0)J (V )− E(1)J ∣∣∣2
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
]2
,(21)
where ||·|| denotes the usual spectral norm, and for any
operator A we use the customary abbreviation |A|2 .=
A†A. However, the impossibility proof would be true if a
bound of the form (20) would be satisfied in the reverse
direction, in which case one would have
1− (PAc )µ,av ≤ min
V
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
J
∣∣∣E(0)J (V )− E(1)J ∣∣∣2
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ ω
(∣∣∣∣∣∣M(1) −M(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣
cb
)
,
(22)
which would correspond to the following continuity argu-
ment: if two CP maps are close in CB-norm, then for a
given fixed Kraus decomposition for one of the two maps,
there is always an alternate Kraus decomposition for the
other map such that the two are close. Since one also
has that ||A|| ≤ ||A||2,where ||·||2 now denotes the Frobe-
nius (Hilbert-Schmidt) norm, the bounding (22) could
also be written with the Frobenius norm in the middle
term (see Eqs. (20) and (21)), in which case the minimum
over V would be in the form of a Procrustes problem [14].
Since as regards the cheating probabilities we have
considered only the case of non-aborting protocols with
perfect-verification, proving the continuity argument (22)
or directly the bound (19) would means that a secure pro-
tocol can still be searched outside such class of protocols.
On the other hand, finding a counterexample to Eq. (19)
would provide a perfectly verifiable and unconditionally
secure protocol.
Finally, a few words on the possibility of a combined
pre/post-cheating Alice attack. It is clear that if it leads
to a set of QO’s different from the prescribed ones, then
it can be detected by Bob at the opening (if it gives the
prescribed set of maps, then the same effect can be better
achieved by post-cheating). However, in principle, it may
help in increasing the overall Alice’s cheating probability,
particularly when there is possibility of abortion, i. e. for
strictly trace-decreasing protocols.
7IV. DISCUSSION
The discrepancy between the previous analysis and the
analysis beneath the impossibility proof [1, 2, 3] is es-
sentially due to the fact that the latter is based on the
assumption that the starting state of the commitment
protocol is openly known, in the sense that the prob-
ability distribution of the state is given, and then the
corresponding mixed state can be purified. The general
underlying idea is that the protocol should be processed
by machines, and therefore all probability distributions
are defined, and purified inside the machines. However,
such an assumption is certainly not realistic for a crypto-
graphic protocol, where each party has actually the free-
dom of changing or tuning the machine, namely chosing
any desired probability distribution. Or else, one would
need to purify the human being himself. Now, if a pa-
rameter is secret for a party, nobody forbids him/her to
believe that the other party is still using the same pre-
pared machine, and accordingly to adopt a Bayesian ap-
proach with the known a priori probability distribution.
However, in practice, the other party could have used an-
other machine and/or with a different preparation. One
can continue to argue on this line, asserting that changing
the machine is equivalent to use a larger machine, or, in
other words, that an unknown probability distribution
can be regarded as an a priori uniform distribution on
the space of probability distributions. This line of rea-
soning, however, constitutes a very dangerous argument
in a proof, since it is equivalent to consider infinite ma-
chines or, equivalently, uniform probabilities on infinite
sets, which then must vanish everywhere. In addition,
for infinite probability spaces one needs infinite dimen-
sional purifications, (even worst, for continuous spaces
one may need non separable Hilbert spaces). This would
invalidate an impossibility proof based on a non proved
continuity argument which a fortiori must apply to infi-
nite dimensions. Finally, one could now argue that in the
real world the machines must be bounded: however, this
assertion would contradict not only the previous assump-
tion of uniform probabilities (otherwise, which non uni-
form probabilities are to be adopted?), but also the fact
that the proof is purported for unconditionally security,
with both Alice and Bob supposed to possess unlimited
technology.
The above hill-posed mathematical framework arises
from the Bayesian approach to secret parameters, dic-
tated from the closed system modeling with fixed ma-
chines and purification of probabilities. This model,
along with the assumed unbounded technology for both
parties, necessarily lead to infinities which don’t allow
unproven continuity arguments, thus falsifying the proof.
Alternative to the previous approach, we have the real-
istic finite open system approach, in which unknown pa-
rameters are treated as such, without the need of any
a priori probability distribution, in which we can ad-
dress the problem for finite dimension with the param-
eter ε depending on it. As well known, the need of
treating unknown parameters without a priori probabil-
ity distribution is the reason why in detection and es-
timation theory[15, 16] we have both the minimax and
the Bayesian approaches. Then, if one proceeds by treat-
ing unknown parameters as such, no openly known state
can be assumed, and the anonymous state encoding of
Yuen[5, 6] leads to the present classification of proto-
cols. Notice that if the initial state |ϕ〉 is openly known,
then for that given fixed states all QO’s can be regarded
as random unitary transformations (since all states are
connected by unitary transformations), and this lead to
the simple form of Alice cheating probability in terms
of fidelities[1, 2, 3], whereas in the present context the
probability of cheating has the more involved form (12),
due to the fact that the state |ϕ〉 is unknown, and that
there are QO’s that don’t admit random unitary Kraus
decompositions.
Finally, a few words on the possibility of aborting
protocols. This possibility was not considered in Refs.
[1, 2, 3], since also this in practice arises as a conse-
quence of not assuming openly known probabilities. In
fact, in a closed model of interacting machines with puri-
fied parameters, every transformation would be unitary.
However, one could reasonably argue that if the protocol
aborts, then another protocol must be started, and the
procedure will be repeated as long as the bit is not suc-
cessfully committed, and that such a succession of pro-
tocols is itself a non aborting protocol. Such kind of
protocols that could be chained ad infinitum can be re-
garded as infinite convex combinations of protocols on
infinite dimensional anonymous spaces H, (the QO will
be trace-preserving only for infinite dimensions). Again
one can see that a closed system approach necessarily
lead to infinite dimensions.
APPENDIX A: DERIVATION OF THE BOUNDS
(20) AND (21) FOR CHEATING PROBABILITIES
Using Jensen inequality as suggested in Ref. [6], the
Alice’s cheating probability can be bounded from below
as follows [here we use the abbreviate notation F
(0)
J
.
=
E
(0)
J (V )]
PAc (V, ϕ) =
∑
J
||E(1)J ϕ||2
(
|〈ϕ|F (0)J †E(1)J |ϕ〉|
||E(1)J ϕ||2
)2
≥
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
J
〈ϕ|F (0)J †E(1)J |ϕ〉
∣∣∣∣∣
2
≥
(
ℜ
∑
J
〈ϕ|F (0)J †E(1)J |ϕ〉
)2
=
[
1− 1
2
〈ϕ|
∑
J
∣∣∣F (0)J − E(1)J ∣∣∣2 |ϕ〉
]2
≥
[
1− 1
2
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
J
∣∣∣F (0)J − E(1)J ∣∣∣2
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
]2
,
(A1)
8where we used |A|2 .= A†A, and the fact that for P ≥ 0
one has ||P || = sup||ϕ||=1 〈ϕ|P |ϕ〉. On the other hand, we
have that∣∣∣∣∣∣M(0) −M(1)∣∣∣∣∣∣2
cb
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣TrF[F (0) · F (0)† − E(1) ·E(1)†]∣∣∣∣∣∣2
cb
≤ ||TrF||cb
∣∣∣∣∣∣F (0) · F (0)† − E(1) · E(1)†∣∣∣∣∣∣2
cb
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣F (0) · F (0)† − E(1) ·E(1)†∣∣∣∣∣∣2
cb
≤
[∣∣∣∣∣∣I · F (0)†∣∣∣∣∣∣
cb
∣∣∣∣∣∣F (0) · I − E(1) · I∣∣∣∣∣∣
cb
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣F (0) · I∣∣∣∣∣∣
cb
∣∣∣∣∣∣I · F (0)† − I · E(1)†∣∣∣∣∣∣
cb
]2
≤ 4
∣∣∣∣∣∣F (0) − E(1)∣∣∣∣∣∣2 ≤ 4 sup
||ϕ||=1
〈ϕ|
∑
J
∣∣∣F (0)J − E(1)J ∣∣∣2 |ϕ〉
= 4
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
J
∣∣∣F (0)J − E(1)J ∣∣∣2
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ .
(A2)
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